Source edition
Plutarch. Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia, Vol. IΙI. Vernardakēs, Grēgorios N., editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1891.
Source data
Perseus Digital Library · CC BY-SA (per Perseus's terms)
Cloned and adapted by Humanitext, with ongoing edits.
Summary
This work is a practical treatise on rhetoric and ethics that addresses the generally disliked act of "self-praise," exploring how one can employ it effectively and appropriately without provoking resentment or envy (phthonos) from others. Drawing on numerous historical examples of statesmen and philosophers such as Pericles, Demosthenes, and Epaminondas, the author analyzes the specific situations in which self-praise is permissible and politically useful. In the first half, the discussion focuses on exceptional circumstances where self-assertion is justified, such as in legitimate self-defense against false accusations or during times of unjust misfortune. The middle section introduces practical techniques to mitigate envy, such as combining self-praise with compliments to the audience, attributing one's success to fortune or the gods, or voluntarily admitting minor flaws and hardships. In the latter half, the text discusses how self-praise can be used constructively to inspire others or admonish the arrogant, while warning against the inherent dangers of vanity and emphasizing the importance of self-restraint when praised by others. Ultimately, the work reframes self-praise not as a sign of mere vanity, but as a carefully controlled skill to be exercised for the sake of virtue and the public good.