Source edition
Plutarch. Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia, Vol IΙI. Vernardakēs, Grēgorios N., editor. Leipzig: Teubner, 1891.
Source data
Perseus Digital Library · CC BY-SA (per Perseus's terms)
Cloned and adapted by Humanitext, with ongoing edits.
Summary
This treatise by Plutarch explores the nature of moral virtue and its relationship with the rational and irrational elements of the human soul. The author begins by surveying earlier theories of virtue, specifically critiquing the Stoic monistic view that regards passions merely as deviations of reason. Drawing instead on Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle, Plutarch advocates for a dualistic psychology that distinguishes between the rational part of the soul and its emotional, irrational counterpart. He explains that practical wisdom (phronesis) shapes moral virtue by guiding the irrational passions toward a harmonious mean, much like tuning a musical instrument. Through a refined analysis of temperance, self-control, and inner conflict, he argues that the very experience of fighting oneself proves the existence of a divided soul. Ultimately, the work concludes that the goal of reason is not the eradication of passions, but their moderation and integration, turning them into valuable allies in the pursuit of virtue.